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Does the Endowment Effect Influence Outcomes in Takings Cases? 
Evidence from Some Important Cases and Implications for Planning Ethics and Practice 
 
1. Introduction 
Takings cases are governed by the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which 
states that private property shall not ―be taken for public use, without just compensation.‖ 
Despite the apparent simplicity of the amendment, the issue remains controversial. For instance, 
the United States Supreme Court (USSC) has noted that it cannot establish a ―set formula‖ for 
determining when a taking has occurred (Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 1978). Controversies of interest to planners usually center on whether a regulation goes 
―too far‖ and what constitutes ―public use.‖1 
The literature on takings falls into two categories: legal and economic. Legal analyses 
include landmark pieces by Michelman (1967), who emphasizes fairness, and Epstein (1985), 
who takes a libertarian perspective. Economic analyses range from rational expectations theory 
(e.g, Blume and Rubinfeld 1984; Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro 1984) to rule-based principles 
(e.g., Sax 1964; Miceli and Segerson 1994).
2
 These approaches share the underlying assumptions 
that landowners, judges, and planners, are rational decision makers and that market efficiency is, 
or should be, a critical consideration in decisions.
3
 However, the assumption of perfect 
rationality has come under attack from a growing body of evidence in behavioral psychology. In 
response to the limitations of the rational model, this literature attempts to explain the law from a 
behavioral perspective (e.g., Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler 1998; Jolls and Sunstein 2006). One 
component of this literature is the endowment effect.  
The endowment effect—also known as the status-quo bias—is the tendency of people to 
hold on to property and rights  that they have, implicitly placing more value on these properties 
2 
and rights than if they never possessed them (Thaler 1980). The endowment effect has been 
found to apply in many contexts, from a reluctance to trade possessions (Kahneman, Knetsch, 
and Thaler 1990; 1991) to a reluctance to change medical plans (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 
1988). The effect is evident in numerous studies that show that people are willing to accept 
(WTA) more for property they own than they are willing to pay (WTP) for the same property if 
they had not owned it (see Horowitz and McConnell 2002 for a summary of some of these 
studies). The endowment effect suggests that allocations of property by independent parties are 
likely to favor those already holding endowments (Korobkin 2003), which include ownership, 
momentum toward ownership, or perceptions of ownership. Against this backdrop, I address my 
first question: Can the endowment effect provide insight into courts’ decisions in takings cases?  
I selected cases for review from a list of important takings cases maintained by the 
Community Rights Counsel (CRC), a nonprofit, public interest law firm based in Washington, 
DC. I do not review all the cases listed by the CRC, but instead concentrate on cases that are well 
known to planners, such as those involving regulations that affect development potential and 
condemnations for economic development. I exclude cases with complicated legal issues, such as 
compensation for temporary takings, except when they pertain to my arguments, and I do not 
claim that my conclusions extend to arcane cases. 
I hypothesize that an examination of takings cases will reveal outcomes that are more 
likely to favor the holders of endowments. Consistent with this hypothesis, I find that in well-
known takings cases that the party favored by endowments—whether governmental or private—
is more likely to prevail in court, regardless of how the court arrives at its decision. My findings 
are consistent with previous findings on the importance of ―first possession‖ and the well-known 
adage that ―possession is nine-tenths of the law‖ (see, e.g., Bell and Parchomovsky 2005). As 
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noted by Kahneman (2011, 308)—one of the founders of the field of behavioral economics4 from 
which this article draws—this adage reflects the high moral status accorded to ―possession‖ and 
it is actually reflected in many judicial opinions (Cohen and Knetsch 1992). The findings of this 
article should therefore not be viewed as surprising, as they build on other research. 
A few general caveats are warranted. First, because the law and its interpretation are not 
fixed, it is difficult to provide a universal theory of takings decisions. And, as is clear from many 
decisions, cases can be decided by slim majorities in courts. For these reasons, I do not claim that 
the endowment effect will predict the outcome of every case. Second, although I review a wide 
range of cases that are familiar to planners, additional research is needed to examine the 
robustness of my findings across an even wider variety of cases and contexts. Finally, additional 
research is needed to examine the size of the endowment effect as it relates to land, how 
demographic characteristics might influence the presence or magnitude of the effect, and 
circumstances under which the effect might be more pronounced or under which it might fade. I 
expand on these points in Section 6. 
Implications for planning ethics and practice 
Governments use eminent domain takings or regulations to achieve some objective. 
Landowners can object in court to both types of government actions, whereupon governments 
must defend their actions. Because ownership—whether real, perceived, or by momentum—is 
important in establishing endowments that can be used to buttress arguments in court, and 
because governments can acquire endowments before court decisions are made, my findings lead 
to my second question: Can planners be ethical—in particular during an era that emphasizes 
deliberative processes—while pursuing strategic actions to acquire endowments in favor of their 
jurisdictions? To answer this question, I draw on literature that discusses the public interest in 
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planning (see, e.g., Alexander 2002), the need for planners to move beyond ideal deliberation 
(see, e.g., Watson 2006), and ―situational ethics‖ (see, e.g., Campbell 2006). I conclude that 
planners can ethically pursue the public interest by strategically acquiring endowments so as to 
increase the chances of successfully defending their actions in court. This conclusion—based on 
current planning scholarship—is mostly normative; more research is needed to examine whether 
planners indeed behave as the ethics literature permits. I will also revisit this issue in Section 6. 
The remainder of the article is as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the USSC’s positions 
on takings. Section 3 reviews the endowment effect. Section 4 examines well-known takings 
cases to demonstrate that decisions appear to be consistent with the endowment effect. Section 5 
examines whether planners can ethically pursue the public interest by strategically acquiring 
property in order to increase the chances of successfully defending their actions in court. Section 
6 suggests avenues for additional research. Section 7 presents my conclusions. 
 
2. A summary of controversies surrounding regulatory and eminent domain takings 
The USSC has had a hard time dealing with takings. For many decades, regulatory 
takings cases were guided by Justice Oliver Holmes’ maxim in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon 
(260 U.S. 393, 1922): ―if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.‖ What 
constituted ―too far‖ has been debated, but generally, as long as affected property still held some 
economic benefit to the owner, the regulation was not considered a taking. This approach was 
supplemented by Justice Brennan’s three-part balancing test in Penn Central, which considered 
whether the regulations affected investment-backed expectations, involved invasion of property, 
and involved some historically recognized government activity. 
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Other cases such as Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (483 U.S. 825, 1987) and 
Dolan v. City of Tigard (512 U.S. 687, 1994) added further confusion to the case law on takings. 
Nollan established that there must be a ―nexus‖ between permitting development and conditions 
placed on the developer. Dolan established that even if there is a nexus, the conditions must be 
―roughly proportional‖ to the developer’s plans. Among regulations that ―go too far,‖ the 
―balancing test,‖ the ―nexus,‖ and ―rough proportionality,‖ there continues to be much 
controversy over what constitutes a regulatory taking, and scholars have struggled to ascertain 
whether there is an underlying rationale for decisions of the USSC. 
Kelo v. City of New London (545 U.S. 469, 2005) touched on the central controversy of 
eminent domain takings: the meaning of ―public use‖ in relation to whether it serves a ―public 
purpose.‖ Until the 1950s, governments’ authority to take private property for public uses was 
taken for granted. However, in the 1950s, Berman v. Parker (348 U.S. 26, 1954) set the stage for 
taking land from one private party to give to another private party. By the time of Kelo in 2005, 
the USSC faced the question of whether economic renewal was a public purpose. The USSC 
decided that the city’s ―determination that the area was sufficiently distressed to justify …. 
economic rejuvenation is entitled to our deference.‖ In summary, current case law on eminent 
domain takings generally defers to governments’ assessments of what constitutes public use. 
Nonetheless, scholars have been unable to provide overall explanations for eminent domain 
takings decisions, and the USSC itself remains conflicted; the Kelo Court was split 5-4. 
 
3. A primer on the endowment effect 
Positive and normative interpretations of land use law assume perfectly rational decision 
makers. One of the underlying characteristics of a perfectly rational decision is that decreases in 
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utility that arise from a loss equal increases in utility that arise from a same-sized gain (see, e.g., 
Posner 2003, Section 1.1, 6-5). However, this assumption has faced increasing criticism because 
of widespread evidence that people treat losses and gains differently. In this model of decision 
making, the pain of a loss is greater than the pleasure of a same-sized gain (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979). For instance, in a widely cited experiment, students who received free coffee 
mugs required more money to part with the mugs than students without mugs were willing to pay 
for them (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990). The first set of students treated the mugs as 
endowments that they acquired. Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) refer to the phenomenon 
where people are unwilling to trade existing allocations as the status quo bias. A related concept 
is ―framing.‖ Language that emphasizes loss produces stronger reactions than language that 
emphasizes gain, because forcing people to accept a loss is considered more unfair than simply 
withholding a potential gain (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1991). 
Numerous studies have identified the endowment effect in a wide variety of situations for 
both tangible and intangible goods. Transactions involving tangible goods include exchanging 
lottery tickets for their nominal value (Knetsch and Sinden 1984), exchanging coffee mugs for 
chocolate bars (Knetsch 1989), and exchanging coffee mugs for cash (Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler 1990). With regard to intangible goods, individuals were willing to pay (WTP) less for a 
decrease in risk than they were willing to accept (WTA) for an equivalent increase in risk 
(Dubourg, Jones-Lee, and Loomies 1994). In another study, participants demanded more to give 
up a view than they were willing to pay to acquire it (Rowe, D'Arge, and Brookshire 1980). 
These differences between WTP and WTA have been widely observed in contingent valuation 
studies (see Horowitz and McConnell 2002 for many examples). 
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The endowment effect can be more pronounced when people believe they have worked 
hard or used their intelligence to obtain endowments (Rachlinski and Jourden 1998). In a 
variation of the coffee-mug test, Loewenstein and Issacharoff (1994) gave mugs to students who 
earned the highest scores on an exam. Half of the recipients were told that they received the 
mugs because of their performance on the exam, while the other half were told that they received 
the mugs randomly. Those who were told that the mugs rewarded their performance demanded 
more money for them than those who were told they were randomly awarded the mugs. 
It seems likely that the endowment effect influences people’s thoughts about land 
because land ownership involves a combination of tangible goods (land), intangible goods (rights 
and emotions), and the hard work often involved to obtain these goods. Indeed, while many 
studies have documented a WTA/WTP ratio of about 2, Horowitz and McConnell (2002) find 
that the average WTA/WTP measure for preserving land was 7. This high figure indicates the 
high value that people place on their land above and beyond its market value. 
However, with a few exceptions (e.g., Fischel 1995a; Korobkin and Ulen 2000; Korobkin 
2003), research has not examined how the endowment effect affects land disputes. For example, 
while Fischel (1995a) notes the WTP/WTA disparity, he restricts his discussions to why the law 
compensates landowners in eminent domain cases at market value rather than the WTA value.
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This lack of research is surprising when one considers that Justice Holmes—the 
godfather of regulatory takings jurisprudence—recognized the importance of endowments. In a 
case concerning adverse possession, Holmes (1897) summarizes the disproportionately high 
value of losses relative to gains: 
It is the nature of man’s mind. A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your 
own for a long time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being and 
cannot be torn away without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, 
however you came by it (477). 
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In Holmes’s opinion, the adverse possessor had established ownership, otherwise known as an 
endowment, and now had more claim to the land than the owner of record.  
Because the endowment effect is so prevalent, it is interesting to examine whether it 
plays a role in the takings decisions of U.S. courts, particularly the USSC. In particular, does the 
possession of endowments—real or perceived—by one party or another sway courts’ decisions?  
 
4. The endowment effect and courts’ takings decisions 
Regulatory takings and exactions 
Land use regulations evolved to prevent nuisances (Prosser 1966). While there are other 
rationales for regulations, the nuisance rationale is widely applied on the basis that no one should 
be allowed to inflict harms on society (Fischel 1985, 155). On the other hand, regulations aimed 
at providing benefits sometimes do not survive the judicial process, on the basis that society 
should not benefit from restrictions imposed on a few (Fischel 1985, 155). Over time, a number 
of other tests have also been applied by the courts to examine regulations, including whether the 
regulation leads to physical occupation, whether it deprives owners of all economically viable 
uses of property, the Penn Central balancing test, and the ―nexus‖ and ―rough proportionality‖ 
tests (the last two refer to exactions; see Wright and Gitelman 2000 144-146). 
The endowment effect provides an explanation for many court decisions on regulations 
and exactions. In general, regulations or exactions that take away endowments—whether from 
private parties or governments—are not likely to withstand judicial review. Likewise, regulations 
or exactions that seek to provide gains to governments at the expense of landowners or to 
landowners at the expense of governments will also probably not survive a judicial process: 
From a behavioral perspective, foregone gains count less than losses to governments or 
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landowners (Cohen and Knetsch 1992). By extension, if landowners cement their rights through 
plans or activities, regulations or exactions that take those rights away are less likely to prevail. 
And if governments cement their rights through plans or activities, courts are more likely to 
favor their regulations or exactions. 
The unequal weighting of losses and gains has implications for the framing of 
regulations. For instance, regulations framed in terms of preventing the loss of existing 
endowments will receive more deference from the courts than regulations framed in terms of 
providing gains. The following two subsections discuss some of these scenarios. 
Endowments and land use regulations: I begin with Keystone Bituminous Coal 
Association v. DeBenedictis (480 U.S. 470, 1987) because it contains the most expansive 
enunciation of the heavier weight given to losses versus gains. The majority on the USSC noted 
that the disputed Subsidence Act (1966) was designed to prevent public harm from underground 
mining and was therefore not a taking even if gains to mining companies were destroyed. 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (505 U.S. 1003, 1992) sheds further light on the 
endowment effect and the importance of framing regulations. Lucas built subdivisions on an 
island off South Carolina since the 1970s. In 1986, he purchased two lots for his own use and 
commissioned plans for homes. The laws in place permitted this use. Changes in the law in 1987 
prevented building on Lucas’ lots. The fact that Lucas had already prepared plans was sufficient 
to establish that he had strong endowments before the new law was passed. In endorsing the 
power of the endowment, Justice Scalia noted in his decision that Lucas had plans and that the 
plans were precisely what he and other developers had been doing for almost two decades.  
It is interesting to observe how interpretations of the 1987 law influenced decisions in 
lower courts. The law was viewed favorably when it was interpreted as preventing the loss of 
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public endowments. For instance, relying on Mugler v. Kansas (123 U.S. 623, 1887), a majority 
of the Supreme Court of South Carolina (SCSC) determined that there was no taking because the 
law intended to prevent ―public harm‖ (404 S.E. 2d, S. Carolina 899, 1991). But two dissenting 
judges read the law as intending to create gains by promoting tourism and visual amenities. Not 
surprisingly, these judges found a taking. In the majority view, potential public losses weighed 
heavily. In the minority view, potential public gains could not justify losses to Lucas. 
Although Justice Scalia questioned the losses/gains (also referred to as harms/benefits) 
distinction, he preserved it with regard to ―background principles‖ of nuisance and property. 
Indeed, post Lucas, lower courts continue to give heavy weight to losses caused by nuisances. 
Blumm and Ritchie (2005) cite numerous cases: For example, the Colorado Supreme Court 
found no taking in Colorado Department of Health v. The Mill (8887 P.2d Colorado, 993, 1994) 
by ruling in favor of use restrictions placed on contaminated land, and the Court of Federal 
Claims ruled in Hendler v. United States (175 F.3d 1374) that the installation of wells by the 
federal government to monitor groundwater contamination was not a taking. Blumm and Ritchie 
(2005) provide other examples of nuisances that have evolved to more than those typically 
allowed by common law (see also Kendall, Dowling, and Schwartz 2000). In the end Lucas has 
had unintended effects as courts invoke both traditional and increasingly expansive 
interpretations of nuisances—as an antecedent inquiry even before the substance of a takings 
argument is heard—to support government actions (Blumm and Ritchie 2005; Ruhl 2007).6, 7 
Justice Scalia himself recognized that new circumstances or knowledge ―may make what 
was previously permissible no longer so,‖ leaving the possibility that environmental concerns 
may warrant restrictions on land use. The evolution of circumstances is worth noting. Wright and 
Gitelman (2000) note the ―impact of the environmental movement‖ (105) and the ―significant 
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trend‖ (106) in courts to uphold environmental statutes. For example, while in the 1960s courts 
struck down flood control ordinances (Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of 
Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 1963 and Dooley v. Town Plan and Zoning Commission of 
Fairfield, 154 Conn. 470, 1967), within a decade courts began to uphold wetlands regulations. 
Indeed, by 1991 in Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands Commission (125 N.J. 193, 1991), the New 
Jersey Supreme Court observed that the robustness of Parsippany-Troy Hills ―has declined with 
the emerging priority accorded to the ecological integrity of the environment.‖ Thus, the trend 
toward more recognition of environmental concerns as posing harms suggests that were Lucas 
adjudicated today, and the legislation unambiguously written as intending to prevent harms, the 
USSC might be more sympathetic to the legislation. The lesson of Lucas therefore is about the 
tug-of-war between private parties that create endowments (e.g., building plans) and 
governments that seek to wrest those endowments away with their own plans, aided by courts 
that permit increasingly expansive interpretations of allowable government actions. 
Unlike the ambiguously worded legislation at contest in Lucas, the ordinance adopted by 
Los Angeles County in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los 
Angeles (482 U.S. 304, 1987) explicitly aimed to preserve public health and safety rather than 
provide benefits to some party. For technical reasons, this case was remanded from the USSC to 
the California Court of Appeals. The lower court upheld the ordinance’s validity. For the 
legislation to be overturned, one or perhaps two conditions would be needed: First, the ordinance 
would have had to be worded in terms of providing benefits. Second—as in Lucas and as 
discussed in other cases later—it would have helped the plaintiff if First English Church had 
detailed or approved plans to rebuild on the property before the ordinance was passed.  
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Similarly, the intent of the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) in Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council, Inc. v. TRPA (535 U. S. 302, 2002) was to avoid environmental losses by 
imposing a development moratorium. As Justice Stevens noted in his ruling, quoting the District 
Court’s decision, ―unless [development] is stopped, the lake will lose its clarity.‖ Perhaps 
ironically, the moratorium was designed to give the TRPA time to complete a comprehensive 
plan: Not only was the moratorium well-worded to prevent losses, but the TRPA increased its 
endowments by completing a plan before the case was decided. 
Pennsylvania Coal is best known for the doctrine that when a regulation goes too far, it is 
a taking. However, setting aside that doctrine, we see that the status quo strongly favored 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. for two reasons. First, the Kohler Act, which prohibited mining that could 
cause subsidence, was passed in 1921. However, in a 1878 deed, Pennsylvania Coal Co. had 
granted Mahon surface rights to the parcel but retained mining rights. Mahon had accepted the 
risks of underground mining by the coal company and waived the right to compensation for 
resulting damage. Second, as Fischel (1995b, Ch 1) discusses in detail, local social norms 
allowed Pennsylvania Coal Co. to continue extracting coal after the Kohler Act.  
While Pennsylvania Coal Co. established that it had amassed endowments in its favor, 
Penn Central Transportation Co. could not do so in Penn Central. Although there is evidence of 
a 1950s sketch for redevelopment, it never progressed past an initial draft. Plans to redevelop 
Grand Central Station were not prepared until 1968, three years after passage of the 1965 New 
York City Landmarks Law seeking to protect historic structures. Like First English Church and 
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc., Penn Central Transportation Co. had failed to establish 
endowments or cement them with plans.  
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Similarly, in Agins v. City of Tiburon (447 U.S. 255, 1980) and San Diego Gas and 
Electric v. City of San Diego (450 U. S. 621, 1981), both cities prevailed because the plaintiffs 
did not cement endowments, whereas the cities acquired endowments through new regulations. 
In Agins, the City of Tiburon failed to acquire Agins’ property by other means, but wished to 
comply with a state law requiring communities to provide open space. Thus it rezoned the land 
containing Agins’ property to lower densities, in effect creating open space. Although Agins had 
bought his property before the rezoning, he never formulated firm plans to develop the land. On 
the contrary, the City ―moved first‖ by rezoning the land. Not surprisingly, courts ruled in favor 
of Tiburon. (See Ellickson and Tarlock 1981 for more details.) 
In San Diego Gas and Electric, the company planned to build a nuclear power plant. But 
as various courts noted, the plaintiff abandoned plans to build the plant after discovering an 
offshore fault that made the project risky. In the meantime, the land was rezoned and identified 
as potential open space as part of San Diego’s open space plan. The City failed to raise a bond 
required for the purchase of the land, and the company sued for compensation, mandamus, and 
declaratory relief (Kmiec 1981-1982). However, two events hurt the company in court: It was 
forced to give up endowments due to natural circumstances, while the City acquired the same 
endowments by virtue of having prepared a plan. 
Endowments and exactions: Nollan is a classic case in which a condition was designed 
to provide benefits rather than prevent harms. The USSC did not uphold the condition. In Nollan, 
the plaintiff wanted to replace a small bungalow with a larger house. The authorities agreed to 
grant permission if Nollan allowed people the right to walk across the property to access the 
adjacent beach. From a behavioral perspective, the condition was designed to provide a benefit to 
the public; it was not intended to prevent a loss. This flaw reduced the likelihood that the courts 
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would uphold the condition. From Nollan’s perspective, it was helpful that he already possessed 
an endowment, which stemmed from leasing the property for many years. Indeed, Nollan 
appeared to understand the power of endowments—perceived or real—and he cemented his 
endowment by buying the property as the case made its way through the courts. 
A hypothetical scenario sheds additional light on the power of endowments. Suppose 
beach-goers had a long history of traversing Nollan’s property to get to the beach. Now, suppose 
Nollan wished to build a house that would block their path. In this case, a condition that he must 
modify his plans and continue to provide access in exchange for a building permit would in all 
likelihood be upheld by the courts because the beach-goers had established a firm endowment in 
their favor. (This situation is similar to adverse possession, as discussed later.) 
In Dolan, the USSC found that there was a nexus between the City of Tigard’s 
regulations and conditions placed on Dolan for expanding her business. Specifically, the City 
required a land dedication along a creek that partially traversed Dolan’s land in exchange for 
approving an expansion of the footprint of her business. The condition aimed to prevent losses 
due to flood damage and traffic congestion that would result from the expansion. Tigard also had 
a well-articulated plan to support its conditions on Dolan. The USSC overturned the conditions 
only because they were too onerous and lacked ―rough proportionality‖ to the petitioner’s plans.  
Tigard may have had a better chance if it had pursued condemnation, backed up by its 
plan for the area. Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist noted that ―had the city simply 
required petitioner to dedicate a strip of land … a taking would have occurred.‖ Tigard would 
have had to compensate Dolan, but the court was likely to view Tigard’s actions as routine use of 
its eminent domain power, supported by endowments acquired through its plans and the 
objective of preventing losses due to flooding and traffic congestion. 
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Summary of regulatory takings and exactions: First, regulations have a greater chance 
of success if they are framed in terms of preventing losses rather than providing gains; as the 
endowment effect predicts, courts are more sympathetic to losses. Notwithstanding Lucas, lower 
courts continue to employ the losses/gains distinction and even since Lucas have taken an 
increasingly expansive view of permissible government actions based on this criterion. Second, 
development plans are critical for establishing endowments and consequently swaying courts’ 
decisions. Third, like private parties, governments can also employ plans as a way to acquire 
endowments and signal investment expectations. In fact, this may explain why courts place less 
emphasis on private land as an endowment and more emphasis on plans. If private land were the 
most important form of endowment, governments would have little chance of regulating it. 
Using plans as endowments levels the playing field: What matters are the development plans of 
private parties versus the regulatory plans of governments.  
Eminent domain takings 
Endowments and economic revitalization: Two controversial cases bookend the 
importance of establishing endowments to justify eminent domain takings: Berman v. Parker and 
Kelo v. City of New London. While both cases were ostensibly about the meaning of ―public 
use,‖ the facts show that winning governments had established critical endowments when the 
cases were heard. In both instances, governments established endowments through a two-step 
process: first, preparing redevelopment plans and second, beginning to implement them. 
In Berman, planners established endowments by preparing redevelopment plans for 
portions of Washington, DC, that they wished to revitalize. By virtue of its legislative powers 
over the District, Congress passed legislation that permitted the planning agency to adopt and 
execute a ―comprehensive or general plan‖ including a ―land use plan‖ (District of Columbia 
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Redevelopment Act of 1945). In his decision, Justice Douglas noted the comprehensiveness of 
the plan. By the time the case reached the courts, not only had the plan been completed but much 
of it had been implemented, firmly cementing endowments in the hands of the city. 
In Kelo, the plaintiffs were at a disadvantage because the City had acquired considerable 
endowments by the time the case reached the USSC. Detailed plans were prepared for a research 
park, conference center, hotel, marinas, museum, and office and retail space. With City 
Council’s consent, the planning agency applied for and obtained permits from state agencies 
(Caves and Cullingworth 2009, 87-90). The plaintiffs found themselves trying to wrest 
endowments from New London. As Justice Stevens notes the majority decision (citing Berman): 
Given the comprehensive character of the plan, the thorough deliberation that 
preceded its adoption … it is appropriate for us … to resolve the challenges of the 
individual owners, not on a piecemeal basis, but rather in light of the entire plan. 
 
Therefore, Berman and Kelo should not be viewed only as debates over the meaning of 
public use. Rather, these cases demonstrate how governments can prevail in courts by preparing 
plans so as to establish endowments and then cementing those endowments by beginning to 
implement the plans. 
My interpretation of Kelo complements that of Nadler and Diamond (2008), who argue—
correctly I believe—that the controversy surrounding Kelo resulted because the public could 
relate to the plaintiffs’ strong emotional attachment to their properties. However, the USSC was 
faced with the facts as presented. While the public correctly recognized endowments possessed 
by the plaintiffs, the public was unaware of the endowments acquired by the government. The 
USSC was required to weigh Kelo’s endowments against the government’s collection of 
endowments: plans, actual implementation activities, and momentum toward redevelopment. 
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Chronologically between Berman and Kelo, Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of 
Detroit (304 N.W.2d Mich. 455, 1981) also emphasizes the importance of endowments. In the 
middle of an economic recession and in response to incentives from the City of Detroit, General 
Motors (GM) notified the city of its willingness to build a new plant in Poletown. GM presented 
the plan to the City in July 1980. Within four months, plans for the project were approved and 
various permits were granted by city, state, and federal officials (Jones, Bachelor, and Wilson 
1986). The magnitude of the endowments and the speed with which they were acquired were 
perhaps even greater than in Berman and Kelo. By the time citizens reacted, the combination of 
GM’s and government’s endowments were already stacked against them. 
The Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in County of Wayne v. Hathcock (684 N.W.2d 
Mich. 765, 2004) poses some challenges to my arguments. In Hathcock¸ the Court overturned 
Poletown. However, Hathcock is instructive because it highlights the likely outcome when 
governments fail to amass endowments. In Hathcock, the County had acquired about 1,300 acres 
of land for an office park. This might appear to be a substantial acquisition of endowments, but 
unlike the governments in Berman, in which there was a ―comprehensive plan‖, Kelo, in which 
there were already detailed redevelopment plans, and Poletown, in which permits and approvals 
were already secured, Wayne County did not establish the critical endowment of a detailed plan, 
obtain permits and approvals, or secure investors. 
Endowments and possession: Adverse possession generally occurs in two ways: The 
owner of record may not realize he owns the land because of ambiguous boundaries or he may 
not know that an adverse possessor occupies his land (e.g., he lives far away). In the former case, 
the owner of record should feel little loss if title for the land is awarded to the adverse possessor 
(Cohen and Knetsch 1992; Stake 2001; Korobkin 2003). The latter case is more complicated 
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because the owner—believing that he still owns the land—may feel he has as much of an 
endowment as the adverse possessor. In this case, the length of time the squatter occupied the 
land and the economic value of the occupation will probably be of critical importance.  
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff (467 U.S. 229, 1984) highlights how the actual 
possession of land increases the chances of gaining title to it. Midkiff arose when the Hawaiian 
legislature passed the Land Reform Act of 1967; large land holdings were condemned and the 
titles sold to lessees. Landowners objected, and the case found its way to the USSC. Although 
Midkiff is not about adverse possession, the lessons of adverse possession noted above shed light 
on this case: Occupation is important. Moreover, the occupiers were not squatters. They were 
living legally on the land and owned structures built on the land, thus giving them an even 
stronger endowment than squatters. While I acknowledge that legal arguments in court centered 
on the meaning of ―public uses‖ and the oligopolistic power of landowners, and I do not extend 
my arguments to suggest that landlords risk losing land though routine leasing transactions, it is 
clear that occupation helped the lessees. To further demonstrate this point, it is important to note 
that the legislation did not permit sales to non-occupiers except under limited circumstances.  
Summary of eminent domain cases: First, preparing plans is critical to governments’ 
successful defense of eminent domain takings. The plan is important not because it demonstrates 
good planning, public involvement, or some public-purpose criterion (contrary to the assertions 
of the head of the American Planning Association, Farmer 2005). Rather, preparing the plan is 
the government’s first step toward establishing endowments. Second, approvals help to cement 
endowments. Third, governments can gradually increase endowments and strengthen their case 
against holdouts by acquiring the property of willing sellers, as Berman and Kelo show. Fourth, 
physically occupying land also creates an endowment. 
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5. Can planners strategically acquire endowments so as to justify condemnation?  
The previous discussions show that governments can prepare plans and create ―facts on 
the ground‖ so as to establish and cement endowments. This increases governments’ chances of 
successfully defending cases brought against them. On the other hand, it is in the interest of 
private parties to have their own plans and to prevent governments from preparing plans because 
plans themselves represent a significant shift in endowments in favor of governments. Indeed, it 
is in the interest of private parties to prevent planning processes—from the very beginning—that 
might lead to new regulations or condemnation. If Kelo et al. had created enough roadblocks 
during the participatory planning process, the final plan for redeveloping New London’s 
waterfront might never have been formulated. 
When governments are the ones attempting to acquire endowments, it raises ethical 
questions for planners. What are the ethical implications of planners acquiring endowments so as 
to justify new regulations or condemnations in court? This question is particularly relevant 
during a planning era that emphasizes deliberative processes. In addressing these issues, I draw 
on Kelo, which in many respects represents a ―typical‖ situation, to illustrate the challenges that 
eminent domain takings pose for ethical planning practice, with particular regard to truth telling. 
New London was a severely blighted community. A redevelopment plan was prepared 
through extensive public discussion and participation. Given the response of Kelo et al., let us 
assume—as is likely the case in similar situations—that many residents objected to the plan. 
Armed with the knowledge that acquiring endowments by preparing a plan and acquiring land 
will make it difficult for Kelo et al. to win in court, how should planners respond? 
In cases such as Kelo, both the consensus-building and implementation stages pose 
quandaries for planners. During the consensus-building phase, there are challenges to principles 
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of communicative rationality, which require planners to speak truthfully. In this phase, could a 
planner say to a community that includes potential holdouts, ―Do not worry about holdouts going 
to court: If we prepare a plan and I strategically acquire land, it will be difficult for them to win.‖ 
Clearly, such a statement—while truthful—would doom any consensus-building attempts, and 
planners wishing to pursue condemnation to promote redevelopment would be wise not to reveal 
this strategy.
8
 During the implementation phase, could a planner rapidly purchase the properties 
of willing sellers so as to acquire critical endowments before holdouts get to court? 
To address these issues, I turn to a discussion of the public interest because it appears to 
be the only avenue that allows planners to behave strategically while still employing elements of 
deliberation. There are layers of issues to be resolved: Is there a public interest justification for 
condemnation? Who determines what is in the public interest? Can planners employ strategic 
behavior in pursuing the public interest while remaining faithful to the values of deliberation? 
Is there a public interest justification for condemnation? In tracing how planners have 
interpreted the public interest, Alexander (2002) and Campbell and Marshall (2002) conclude 
that the concept of the public interest is still alive among planners (Campbell and Marshall in 
particular draw on Howe 1992; Howe 1994; see also Moroni 2004). Moreover, while scholars of 
communicative rationality stress the multiplicity of interests (Forester 1989; Healey 1996), 
Campbell and Fainstein (2003, 13) conclude that these scholars are actually ―renewing‖ a focus 
on the public interest, but in ways that differ from previous technocratic or advocacy approaches. 
Campbell and Fainstein conclude that throughout the evolution of planning theory, ―the central 
task of planners‖ has always been ―serving the public interest‖; it remains the ―leitmotiv‖ that 
holds planning theory together (Campbell and Fainstein 2003, 13).  
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Further, even as some academics question its existence, professional planners clearly feel 
otherwise; the AICP Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct (American Institute of Certified 
Planners 2005, 2009) is filled with references to the public interest. And, while I have primarily 
relied on planning scholarship to argue the existence of a public interest, the case law on takings 
itself highlights its centrality through direct reference. Cases as diverse as Lucas, First English, 
Tahoe-Sierra, Penn Central, Kelo, and Berman explicitly discuss the public interest. 
Having established the centrality of the public interest in planning, we are still left to 
resolve whether it has been or can be used as the basis for takings. From a planning perspective, 
the traditional understanding of the public interest as the ―collective interest of the community‖ 
(Klosterman 1985, 15) remains powerful (see also Altshuler 1965; Mazza 1990). The cases 
examined earlier highlight these collective interests: From Penn Coal to Poletown, Lucas, Kelo, 
and Agins, the actions in question addressed community interests. In Poletown and Kelo, the 
community’s need for economic development drove the decisions to condemn private lands. In 
Lucas and Agins, environmental interests prompted the regulations. For planners, community 
interests have been and will likely continue to be the motivation guiding takings. (Scholars such 
as Brooks (2002) believe that personal ethics should also help determine the public interest, but I 
believe that the role of ethics is best left for the following sub-section.)  
Who determines what is in the public interest? While previous generations of officials 
reserved this role for themselves, in a pure form of communicative planning, the public interest 
should emerge through deliberation that is deontological ―through and through‖ (Campbell and 
Marshall 2002, 180). However, Campbell and Marshall (2002), Alexander (2002), Pløger (2004), 
and Watson (2006) argue that dialogical forms of deliberation cannot be relied on to articulate 
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the public interest when there are strong divisions of interests, as in the case of eminent domain 
takings. These arguments are echoed by Huxley (2000) and Flyvbjerg (1998). 
Campbell and Marshall (2002) conclude that communicative rationality is incapable of 
defining the public interest and that planning—and by extension planners—are critical in 
articulating it. Although not discussing the role of planners in defining the public interest, 
Watson (2006) advocates alternatives to deliberation, arguing that alternatives can lead to better 
outcomes. And even well-known advocates of communicative rationality acknowledge that 
things have to start somewhere. For example, Innes and Booher (2010, 92) note that planners can 
be ―leaders and sponsors‖ by identifying problems and/or taking the initiative to find solutions.9 
Fortunately, the planning literature, including the literature on communicative planning, 
provides guidance for current-day planners on how to articulate the public interest. At the heart 
of this guidance is the elevation of the public interest to the level of planners’ ethics (e.g., Brooks 
2002, Chs. 5 and 9; Ploger 2004). To be sure, scholars who blend communicative rationality with 
ethics in carving a role for planners to determine the public interest build on the work of other 
planning ethicists who precede the rise of deliberative practice, such as Bolan (1983) and Howe 
and Kaufman (1979);
10
 this highlights the fact that planners’ ethics have been critical in 
determining the public interest for a long time. 
Such ethics operate within specific contexts. Planners must—and are encouraged to—
make ethical choices about what is better for the community. Campbell and Marshall (1999, 476) 
argue that when planners make choices, the reality of ―the socio-economic and institutional 
contexts‖ within which they find themselves should take precedence over a procedural emphasis 
on deliberation. Further, drawing on O’Neill (2000) and Young (1990), Campbell (2006) 
discusses how ethical judgment allows planners to move from universal ethical principles to 
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situated contexts. One of Campbell’s examples involves what do to with a piece of greenspace: 
preserve it for environmental protection or use it to provide affordable housing? These planning 
problems are ―situated‖ and ―must be handled by some form of institution probably under the 
aegis of the state‖ (Campbell and Marshall 2006, 246).  
Planners face similar conditions when contemplating actions that might lead to takings. 
From Berman to Kelo and Lucas, planners made choices that translated ethical principles to 
situated contexts. Of course, planners could sometimes get it wrong, in that supposedly universal 
principles, like those accepted at the time of Berman, are now considered inappropriate. 
Nonetheless, there is ample historical evidence to show that planners have adapted general 
ethical values to suit certain situations (see, e.g., Howe 1992; 1994 for examples). In particular, 
the implied ethical principle behind takings, at least in the post-Berman era, has been to promote 
economic revitalization and environmental goals at the expense of property owners. 
Planners’ leeway in shaping the public interest does not mean that they should not use 
deliberative processes, nor does it mean that planners are the only arbiters of the public interest. 
As Campbell and Marshall (2002) point out, planners’ interpretation of the public interest can 
and should be vetted by a participatory process. But, as Young (2000) notes, such processes 
should be guided by a desire to achieve good outcomes. The point at which public processes 
should give way to the public interest will depend on planners’ personally defined values 
(Brooks 2002, 76-77), as discussed in many examples provided by Howe (1992;1994). 
Ultimately, electoral politics and the vicissitudes of electoral democracy will determine whether 
planners—as agents of elected officials—used their judgment appropriately (Brooks 2002, 




Finally, should planners act strategically during a participatory plan-making process 
and during implementation of the plan? This issue is of utmost importance, but I deal with it 
only briefly because I rely on the arguments above that situated ethical judgment permits 
planners to act strategically. In particular, during a deliberative process it is this ethical judgment 
that permits planners to depart from ideal deliberation by withholding the fact that they have a 
strategy to counter landowners like Kelo et al. And this ethical judgment further permits planners 
to get facts on the ground by rapidly buying the properties of willing sellers. Indeed, this may 
well have been the two-part strategy employed by planners in New London. As Campbell and 
Marshall (2002) and Watson (2006) might argue, substantive concerns about economic 
revitalization trump the need for ideal deliberation. 
I acknowledge that this behavior borders on unethical because it involves withholding 
information
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 and singling out citizens such as Kelo et al. But the planning literature implicitly 
endorses such behavior. In discussing the politics of planning, Brooks (2002 Ch 12) notes the 
importance of negotiation and utilizing power relationships in the context of planners’ personal 
values and visions for the community. To be sure, I do not take such behavior lightly: It involves 
lying by omission which can be interpreted as a misuse of power. But in the absence of other 
―moral philosophical sources to inform our thinking‖ (Watson 2006, 46), I see no other avenue if 
planners wish to pursue the public interest and avoid having their actions overturned by  courts.
13
 
(Parallel arguments can be made about regulations. For instance, suppose planners learn 
through the grapevine of discussions to develop environmentally sensitive land that is not 
protected by appropriate regulations. The ethical question is whether planners should ―work 
behind the scenes‖ to establish ownership by engaging in a race with private developers to see 
who prepares a plan first or influence other legislative outcomes to prevent development.) 
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6. Avenues for further research 
This article suggests areas of research on how courts view endowments and takings, 
planners’ strategies for prevailing in courts, planners’ perceptions about the ethics of these 
strategies, and citizens’ perception about endowments and takings. As part of the emerging field 
of behavioral psychology and law, there is a growing literature on the intersections of property 
and psychology that can provide guidance for future investigations. In making recommendations 
for research, I draw on a special issue of the Tulane Law Review (2009) titled ―A psychological 
perspective on property law.‖ The following is a discussion of possible avenues for research: 
1. While I examined cases across a spectrum of scenarios ranging from regulatory takings and 
exactions to eminent domain takings, future research is needed to corroborate my arguments 
by examining additional cases. In particular, I have examined mostly ―classic‖ cases known 
to planners. I hypothesize that my findings will broadly extend to other cases. 
2. Empirical research can examine whether planners actively acquire endowments to strengthen 
their positions in courts. Because most takings cases are settled outside of court, not many 
planners are likely to have faced the threat of judicial proceedings, and so obtaining adequate 
samples for research may be difficult. Nonetheless, surveys could inquire about whether 
planners engage in acquiring endowments as an ―insurance policy‖ in the unlikely event that 
landowners go to court, and what planners feel about the ethical implications of such actions. 
I note that my discussions in Section 5 on implications for planning ethics were not a 
positivist discussion of how planners behave. Rather, I was exploring how planners can be 
ethical in an era of deliberative planning. I have no evidence about how planners actually 
behave when faced with the possibility that a landowner may go to court. For this reason, I 
am unable to formulate hypotheses about the results of such surveys. 
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3. Studies could be conducted on citizens to ascertain the strength of the endowment effect and 
its implications for takings. Studies citied earlier (Horowitz and McConnell 2002) provide 
multiple examples of how such studies can be replicated. As Blumenthal (2009) notes, 
variations of such research could examine what citizens think is appropriate compensation 
for eminent domain takings. For example, should sentimental attachment be considered, 
perhaps measured by the length of time someone lived in his home, or should compensation 
include some standard premium above fair market value? Indeed, in response to Kelo, as of 
2009, four states (Michigan, Indiana, Kansas, and Missouri) have increased compensation for 
takings to at least 125 percent of market value (Chang 2010). This suggests some recognition 
of the endowment effect, but whether this goes far enough is still an empirical question.
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4. There is also a lack of research on how much is actually paid to landowners before takings 
cases get to court. While Chang (2010) provides a recent study, his research was performed 
in New York City only, which may not be representative of all the U.S. Evidence of awards 
compared to existing market value would shed light on how much governments already pay 
heed to the endowment effect. 
5. Researchers may also investigate if it is optimal for jurisdictions to pay landowners amounts 
above market value in eminent domain takings. Higher payments must, of course, be 
balanced against the economic benefits of the project, so that the costs of condemnation do 
not exceed those benefits. But would higher payments to landowners save the expenses of 
litigation when landowners resist eminent domain takings, such as in Kelo?  
6. Other studies can simulate the facts of known takings cases to ascertain how citizens would 
decide these cases.
15
 Such studies provide an opportunity to compare the legal concept of 
property as a bundle of rights with the layperson’s view of property as a discrete asset (Nash 
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2009), and may shed light on why citizens find certain takings objectionable. Exploring how 
perceptions of property vary by gender, race, and age may also help planners understand 
when the public might object to a taking. For instance, in areas with older populations, are 
planners likely to encounter more opposition to certain regulations or condemnations? Does 
the length of time a person owns property influence his/her valuation of it? 
7. Related to Point 6 are a growing number of studies about how people come to conclusions 
about ownership based on possession. For example, Friedman and Neary (2009) discovered 
that ownership is often assigned to people who have ―first possession,‖ even if possession is 
only insinuated rather than supported by substantive evidence. Studies can explore how the 
public assigns ownership based on perceptions of who possesses the property. 
8. In addition to studies that examine the psychological premium that should be paid to 
landowners in takings cases, other studies could examine whether landowners overestimate 
the negative emotional impacts of losing property or whether the endowment effect fades 
rapidly with time (Blumenthal 2009). In particular, what non-pecuniary actions can planners 
take to ameliorate the pain of losing one’s home? 
 
7. Conclusions 
This article introduced the concept of the endowment effect, an empirical observation 
rooted in behavioral psychology that people value losses more than they value gains. Because 
takings involve the loss of property, it is interesting to examine whether the endowment effect 
might be reflected in judicial decisions involving controversial takings cases. My research leads 
me to conclude that the endowment effect helps explain controversial takings decisions. I 
acknowledge that the arguments presented in this article may not always hold. Takings cases are 
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too complicated to assert that a single theory will always predict how the courts will rule. 
Nonetheless, the endowment effect appears to have considerable predictive power. 
The following four salient findings about endowments and takings resulted from this 
research: 1) Notwithstanding Lucas, regulations that are written to emphasize losses to society 
rather than gains are more likely to survive judicial review; 2) Endowments can include 
comprehensive plans, development plans, investments, permits, and laws; 3) both governments 
and private parties can acquire endowments such as plans, investments, and permits in attempts 
to sway courts in their favor; and 4) occupying land creates a strong endowment. My findings 
should not be viewed as surprising as they build on an emerging body of research. 
The high value placed on deliberation raises questions about whether planners can 
ethically behave strategically to acquire endowments so that their actions can survive judicial 
review. Many planning theorists have articulated the continuing importance of the public interest 
and the role of planners in achieving it. Situational ethics, which guides the day-to-day decisions 
of planners, permits planners to use their judgment to depart from ideal deliberation in pursuit of 
the public interest. Planners may, for example, use their ethical judgment to create endowments 
by buying the properties of willing sellers while some landowners holdout in an eminent domain 
case, engaging in a race to prepare plans for environmentally sensitive land before private 
developers can do so, or otherwise seeking to influence legislative processes. 
There is a need for further research to see if my findings about the endowment effect hold 
across a wider set of land use cases. I also suggest research intended to highlight the presence of 
the endowment effect among citizens, understand how this effect might vary in different 
circumstances, help planners understand the public’s discomfort with takings, and shed light on 
planners’ perceptions of their own ethics.  
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1
 Eminent domain taking is the taking of land for public use, for which just compensation must be paid. Regulatory 
takings result when regulations that are a valid exercise of police power amount to an eminent domain taking 
because the regulations are excessive (Roberts 2002). One other form of regulations—exactions, which are 
conditions imposed on developers in exchange for permission to build—may also be found to be a taking if they ―go 
too far‖ (Wright and Gitelman 2000, 131). While the United States Supreme Court (USSC) has formulated different 
rules for exactions, the literature frequently considers exactions to be a subset of regulations (see, e.g., Wright and 
Gitelman 2000, Ch V; Juergensmeyer and Nicholas 2002), and I take that approach in this article.  
2
 Other literature includes Fischel (1995b), who explains case law through evolving political and economic trends, 
and Tribe (2000, Chs 11 and 15), who explains the Lochner era through the lens of laissez-faire economics.  
3
 Legal analyses are often translated into economic terms, and some consider the protection of property and 
economic efficiency as two sides of the same coin (see Jacobs 2010 for a review of these arguments). 
4
 This research is part of a larger field of study on how psychology affects choice and decision-making. See, for 
example, Hogarth (1987), Plous (1993), and Rabin (1998) for reviews. 
5
 Fischel (1995a) reasons that paying the WTA price would impose higher taxes on everyone; paying market value 
reduces the public’s burden while offering a reasonable price. Knetsch and Borcherding (1979) make similar points. 
6
 Further, regulations that lead to a total wipeout of benefits are very rare. The most well-known case that highlights 
the difficulty in applying the Lucas rule is Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (533 U.S. 606, 2001), where even a 94 percent 
reduction in property value from $3.5 million to $200,000 was insufficient to invoke the rule. 
7
 There are reasons to question Justice Scalia’s analysis of the losses/gains distinction. First, in equating losses with 
gains, he cites Claridge v. New Hampshire Wetlands Board (125 A.2d N.H. 292, 1984) and Bartlett v. Zoning 
Commission of the Town of Old Lyme (161 Conn. A. 2d 910, 1971). Both cases involved laws intended to prevent 
the filling of wetlands: In the former, because of potential harms to the public and in the latter because of the 
benefits of wetlands. Thus, Justice Scalia argued that the law could be written either way. However, he failed to note 
the different outcomes of the two cases. In the first, courts ruled that there was no taking; this is not surprising from 
a behavioral perspective because of the high value placed on the avoidance of harms (losses). In the second, courts 
found that there was a taking; again, this is not surprising given the lower value placed on the provision of benefits 
(gains). Second, while Justice Scalia cited Sax (1964) to suggest that Lucas was a case of ―independently desirable 
uses‖, he overlooked numerous other literature that maintains the losses/gains distinction, for example, Sax (1971), 
Dunham (1958; 1962), and Bosselman et al. (1973). Finally, Justice Scalia failed to take his own equivalence of 
losses and gains to its logical conclusion. In noting that South Carolina must identify background nuisances that 
would negatively affect neighbors, Justice Scalia could well have said that the state should identify benefits that 
would accrue to neighbors if Lucas were not permitted to build. Fisher III (1993) takes a similar perspective, arguing 
that legislators could easily make their regulations ―Lucas proof‖ by emphasizing economic benefits. 
8
 Deliberative practice would permit the community to decide what percentage of participant approval constitutes 
―consensus‖ (Innes and Booher 2010, 94). However, an astute Kelo et al. would make certain that the specified 
percentage requires the agreement of potential holdouts. Further, while deliberation allows negotiation (Innes and 
Booher 2010, 28), there is a limit to how much this can be done. Suppose planners raised their bid on property 
owned by holdouts. Given the intensity with which holdouts oppose condemnation, it is clear that the bid would 
have to be large, so that the economic rationales for the takings may no longer be valid. 
9
 To be sure, Innes and Booher (2010) would place limits on the subsequent role of planners and defer to citizens to 
craft solutions. However, there are issues of importance, such as global climate change, for which planners will have 
to take a leading role in finding solutions without waiting for solutions to emerge from a deliberative process. 
10
 More recent examples of scholars who discuss planning ethics but only indirectly link it to communicative 
rationality include Baum (1998) and Bollens (2002). 
11
 Others, both inside and outside of government, also seek to articulate the public interest. However, this is an 
article about planners and so I do not address the role of others in determining the public interest. 
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12
 To be sure, communicative rationalists endorse the strategic use of information (e.g., Forester 1989, 41-43). 
However, Forester is concerned about equalizing power differentials between unequal non-government parties; he 
does not appear to address the strategic use of information by governments against private parties. 
13
 I am not comfortable with this conclusion, but absent other strategies that can withstand the scrutiny of courts 
while pursuing the public interest, other options appear limited. 
14
 Increases in compensation post Kelo should not be interpreted to mean that states have made it more difficult for 
governments to use eminent domain takings for economic development purposes. As Jacobs and Bassett (2011) and 
Somin (2009) note, although 43 states have passed Kelo reform laws as of 2010, these laws are mostly cosmetic.  
15
 I make no claim that research on citizens will confirm my argument that courts tend to side with parties that have 
greater claims to endowments. There are always likely to be differences between how the courts and the public 
perceive endowments, because courts see all endowments during legal arguments, whereas the public sees 
endowments only as they are expressed in the media, as in Kelo, Lucas, and Poletown. 
